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To have standing in a federal suit, a litigant must meet both con-
stitutional and prudential requirements. Under the constitutional test,
which arises from Article III's Case or Controversy Clause,' the plain-
tiff must establish a concrete injury in fact, causation between the al-
leged injury and the alleged conduct of the defendant, and redressabil-
ity.2 To these constitutional requirements the Court has added pruden-
tial requirements: the plaintiff must assert her own particularized
rights, and the plaintiffs complaint must fall "within the zone of inter-
ests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guar-
antee in question."3
The Court has established two narrow exceptions to this pruden-
tial doctrine. First, under associational standing, an association may
bring suit on its members' behalf when the members would have
standing in their own right, even if the association is not itself injured.'
Second, third-party standing allows a litigant to bring suit on behalf of
a third party if the litigant and third party share a "close relationship,"
the litigant is also injured, and the third party is hindered from bring-
ing the suit on her own behalf.5 Recently, a divided Third Circuit held
that these two narrow exceptions may be combined to create a third
exception to prudential standing doctrine called derivative standing.!
Derivative standing arises when an association pursues a claim that
some or all of its members would have third-party standing to bring.
t A.B. 1999, Princeton University; J.D. Candidate 2004, The University of Chicago.
1 US Const Art III, § 2, cl 1.
2 See Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555,560-61 (1992).
3 Valley Forge Christian College v Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc, 454 US 464,474-75 (1982) (quotation marks omitted).
4 See Hunt v Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 US 333,342 (1977).
5 See Powers v Ohio, 499 US 400,411 (1991).
6 See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society v Green Spring Health Services, Inc, 280 F3d 278
(3d Cir 2002), cert denied, 123 S Ct 102 (2002) (upholding standing of a medical association to
sue on behalf of its members' clients). A few other courts have implicitly permitted derivative
standing without discussion. See Fraternal Order of Police v United States, 152 F3d 998,1001-02
(DC Cir 1998) (allowing policemen's association to litigate on behalf of non-member police offi-
cers supervised by member chief law enforcement officers); Ohio Association of Independent
Schools v Goff, 92 F3d 419, 421-22 (6th Cir 1996) (allowing association of independent schools
to litigate on behalf of parents of students attending member schools); Public Citizen v FTC, 869
F2d 1541, 1550 (DC Cir 1989) (allowing public action group to sue on behalf of its members'
children to require a federal agency to prohibit the sale of items advertising smokeless tobacco
without a health warning).
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In other words, the association derives its claim from outside claims
that its members would have third-party standing to pursue. The test
for derivative standing thus entails two prongs: 1) the litigating asso-
ciation must show that it has associational standing on behalf of its
members; and 2) the association must show that its members have
third-party standing on behalf of some third-party right-holders.
The combination of associational and third-party standing, how-
ever, relies on an uncertain interpretation of past Supreme Court de-
cisions. The Court has said that, to achieve associational standing, an
association's members must have standing in their own right. The
Court has not specified whether the members' standing must be first-
party (in other words, the members must have standing to assert
claims on their own behalf) or whether it may be third-party (in other
words, the members may assert claims on others' behalf). Choosing to
allow associations to assert members' third-party claims means adopt-
ing a new brand of representational standing, one in which there are
two steps of removal between the litigant and the right-holder rather
than the one step permitted in associational and third-party standing
individually!
It is necessary to examine whether derivative standing involves a
relationship too attenuated to meet jurisprudential requirements.
Each additional step of removal raises concerns about the quality of
the adversarial proceedings and due process. First, it is questionable
whether an association litigating, not its members' claims but its
members' third parties' claims, provides the "concrete adverseness,
8
that standing doctrine seeks to ensure. Second, an association's self-
interested suit may negatively affect its members' third parties' claims
without affording them adequate process. Finally, derivative standing
may provide ideologically-minded associations with new, unfettered
capacity to pursue the rights of diffuse, unwitting, and potentially un-
willing third parties in Article III courts in order to achieve political
goals better left to legislatures.
In this Comment, I argue that courts should uphold derivative
standing. A thorough analysis of the theoretical underpinnings and
policy objectives of the associational and third-party standing doc-
trines, which have enjoyed consistent support from the Court,9 reveals
7 In associational standing, the association has a direct relationship with its members on
whose behalf it s litigating. In third-party standing, the litigant has a direct relationship with the
right-holder on whose behalf she is litigating. In derivative standing, the association has no direct
relationship with the right-holder on whose behalf it is litigating; the association's relationship
rests with its members, whose relationship in turn rests with the right-holder.
8 Baker v Carr, 369 US 186,204 (1962).
9 See, for example, International Union, UAW v Brock, 477 US 274 (1986) (upholding as-
sociational standing); Powers, 499 US at 410-16 (upholding third-party standing).
1038 [70:1037
Representational Standing
that their combination is both theoretically sound and a good policy
decision. In Part I, I provide a more detailed explanation of derivative
standing, as well as a discussion of the existing analysis. In Part II, I
provide a background discussion of the standing doctrine and an ex-
planation of the theoretical and policy rationales that have been of-
fered in support of associational and third-party standing. In Part III, I
argue that the restrictions that courts have applied to associational
and third-party standing combine to ensure that derivative standing
both preserves concrete adverseness and avoids due process problems.
I also analyze the benefits of derivative standing and situate derivative
standing in the ongoing scholarly debates over the role of standing in
the separation of powers.
I. DERIVATIVE STANDING
A. Derivative Standing Defined
Derivative standing constitutes one more extension of the repre-
sentative standing doctrine that allows litigants to bring the claims of
non-parties, as in associational and third-party standing. In associa-
tional standing, an association brings its members' claims rather than
the association's own claims; the association need not suffer injury in
its own right. '° In third-party standing, a litigant brings the claims of a
third party rather than her own; the litigant must also have suffered
some injury, and the third party must be somehow hindered from
bringing suit on her own behalf." Derivative standing results from
combining these two well-recognized exceptions to the prudential
limitations on standing, so that an association is permitted to bring
claims for which its members would have third-party standing.
1. Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society.
In Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society v Green Spring Health Ser-
vices, Inc,'2 a divided Third Circuit allowed an association of psychia-
trists to litigate on behalf of its members' clients, thereby authorizing
the combination of the two exceptions to the standing doctrine.'3 The
case involved a suit brought by a psychiatrists' trade association,
Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society (PPS), against various managed care
organizations. PPS alleged that the health care groups improperly re-
fused to authorize necessary treatment for the member psychiatrists'
patients; PPS sought to sue on the patients' behalf in both tort and
10 See note 4 and accompanying text.
11 See note 5 and accompanying text.
12 280 F3d 278 (3d Cir 2002), cert denied, 123 S Ct 102 (2002).
13 See id at 291-93.
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contract. Confronted with the preliminary issue of whether PPS had
standing, the Third Circuit first decided that the member psychiatrists
would have third-party standing to litigate on behalf of their clients:
The psychiatrists were themselves injured by the practice in question,
they had the appropriate close relationship with their clients, and the
stigma of mental illness constituted a sufficient hindrance to the cli-
ents representing themselves.'
4
Because the member psychiatrists thus would individually have
standing (albeit third-party standing), the majority concluded that the
first requirement of the test for associational standing-namely that
the association's members have standing in their own right-was satis-
fied.5 The majority justified its analysis by explaining that "[t]he Su-
preme Court did not delineate ... which types of claims associations
could bring on behalf of their members, but rather simply held that 'an
association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members' when
the requisite elements are established.' 6 According to the Third Cir-
cuit, the only requisite element in question in Pennsylvania Psychiatric
Society was whether the psychiatrists would otherwise have standing;
since the court found that the psychiatrists' third-party standing was
sufficient to satisfy this requirement, it held standing to be proper.
This combination of associational and third-party standing effectively
created a new doctrine. The court's holding, however, did not consti-
tute a tremendous departure from previous standing decisions. With-
out explicitly recognizing derivative standing, many courts had implic-
itly accepted the concept prior to the Third Circuit's decision.
2. Justifying Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society.
The Third Circuit's decision makes sense on practical grounds:
Had the court decided not to allow derivative standing, it would have
functionally prevented the patients' claims from reaching litigation.
The claim at issue was the patients' right under HMO contracts to au-
thorization of psychiatric treatment. The court found that the patients
were hindered from bringing their own claims because of the stigma
14 See id at 289-91. The Supreme Court has similarly held that doctors may bring third-
party claims on behalf of their patients. See, for example, Singleton v Wulff, 428 US 106, 118
(1976) (holding that "it generally is appropriate to allow a physician to assert the rights of
women patients as against governmental interference with the abortion decision").
15 See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society, 280 F3d at 291. The Third Circuit then remanded
the case for determination of whether the other requirements of associational standing were
satisfied. See id at 294.
16 Id at 291, quoting Hunt v Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 US 333,
343 (1977).
17 See note 6. None of these courts expressed awareness that they were permitting a poten-
tially controversial variety of standing.
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of mental illness." Thus, the patients would see their claims vindicated
only if another party litigated their interests through representational
standing. But no individual psychiatrist was likely to front the substan-
tial resources required to litigate a patient's claim," even though the
psychiatrists would also benefit by the enforcement of the patients'
treatment authorization rights. Third-party standing alone, therefore,
would not suffice to provide the patients access to the courts.
On the other hand, associational standing alone also could not
bring about litigation of the patients' claims. PPS enjoyed the pooled
resources of its member psychiatrists and could thus afford to litigate
the patients' authorization rights. However, associational standing
would allow PPS to litigate its member psychiatrists' claims, but not
the patients' claims. Since the right to treatment authorization be-
longed to the patients and not the psychiatrists, PPS could not reach it
through associational standing alone.
Derivative standing unites PPS's resources with the patients' col-
orable claims. Under derivative standing, PPS could derive standing
from its member psychiatrists' third-party standing to bring the pa-
tients' claims. Instead of leaving the patients incapable of vindicating
their alleged rights to treatment authorization, derivative standing
helps both the patients and the psychiatrists by allowing the validity of
those rights to be determined on the merits. Allowing derivative
standing may well represent the only way such a case could go for-
ward.
B. Why Derivative Standing May Be Problematic
1. Separation of powers.
Derivative standing may challenge one of standing's primary
goals: to ensure that courts operate within the constitutionally appro-
priate bounds of the judicial branch's authority without compromising
the principle of separation of powers. In a dissenting opinion in Penn-
sylvania Psychiatric Society, Judge Nygaard questioned whether de-
rivative standing had a basis in the law:
PPS cannot piggy-back two discrete exceptions, to swallow up the
long-standing rule that litigants must assert their own rights and
interests. I cannot find, nor does PPS cite, any authority for stack-
ing or piggy-backing these relationships into an attenuated con-
18 See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society, 280 F3d at 290.
19 The psychiatrists' ability to bring third-party claims in their individual capacity was not a
question before the Third Circuit. I am simply assuming that most psychiatrists would not indi-
vidually pursue a claim on behalf of a patient absent extraordinary circumstances.
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catenation of exceptions to the standing rule so as to confer
standing on PPS.20
Not explicitly mentioned -though clearly a present concern-in this
dissent is the impact of derivative standing on separation of powers.
The Supreme Court and then-Judge Scalia have touted the principle
of standing as a necessary feature of the separation of powers. By lim-
iting the opportunity to litigate to those who have actual "Cases" or
"Controversies" under Article III, the standing doctrine effectively
21prevents courts from acting outside of their constitutional scope.
"Absent the necessary allegations of demonstrable, particularized in-
jury [as the standing test requires], there can be no confidence of 'a
real need to exercise the power of judicial review' or that relief can be
framed 'no broader than required by the precise facts to which the
court's ruling would be applied..' ' Since broad questions of policy-
better suited to legislative determination -do not rise to the level of
"Cases" or "Controversies," standing doctrine keeps them out of the
courts.
Derivative standing, however, may allow for precisely the type of
legislative-style adjudication that the standing doctrine attempts to
prevent: It permits a centralized group to litigate on behalf of an in-
creasingly diffuse body of non-members who may be neither willing to
have their claims so pursued nor even aware of the association's ac-
tions on their behalf. All forms of representational standing compro-
mise the courts' assurance that the party before them is litigating an
injury to a cognizable right in need of redress: The very fact that the
party is not representing her own interest causes this doubt.2 Deriva-
tive standing may compound this concern because the association-
two steps removed from the third-party right-holder-is even less
closely connected to the concrete injury. If the litigating association in
derivative standing fails to adequately demonstrate a concrete, par-
20 280 F3d at 295.
21 See Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 560 (1992) (calling standing "[olne of
those landmarks, setting apart the 'Cases' and 'Controversies' that are of the justiciable sort re-
ferred to in Article III-'serving to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved
through the judicial process'), quoting Whitmore v Arkansas, 495 US 149, 155 (1990); Antonin
Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk
U L Rev 881 (1983).
22 Warth v Seldin, 422 US 490, 508 (1975), quoting Schlesinger v Reservists to Stop the War,
418 US 208,221-22 (1974).
23 See Warth, 422 US at 500:
Without such limitations [as the prudential requirement that parties represent their own in-
terests] the court would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public signifi-
cance even though other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the
questions and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual
rights.
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ticularized injury but rather asserts a mush of grievances widely
shared among third-party right-holders, the association will misuse the
court to achieve an end better pursued through the legislature. Add
into this the general concern that ideologically-minded associations
may make use of derivative standing to practice interest group politics
in the courts. This new brand of representational standing opens up
countless persons' potential claims to litigation by ideologically-
minded associations irrespective of the claim-holders' wishes.
These problems do not arise when associations assert standing on
behalf of their own voluntary members: These associations are merely
consolidating a number of common claims that members could have
brought on their own behalf. 24But when associations litigate on behalf
of non-members, some fear that a discrete group aided by pooled re-
sources could set an agenda that has effects beyond the group's volun-
tary membership, and on third parties who are given no opportunity
to opt out or affect the course of action that the group takes. The sepa-
ration-of-powers view of standing posits that policy should not be
made through the courts in this way except when the violation of one
of the litigants' private rights is at issue." Adherents of this view would
surely demand that associations not be able to bring their own self-
motivated suits on behalf of large, diverse groups of unwitting, poten-
tially unwilling third parties.26
2. Adversarial quality and due process.
In addition to these separation-of-powers concerns, derivative
standing may raise more immediate worries about how those third
parties' rights will fare in the face of a derivative standing action. As-
sociations bringing suit on behalf of third parties who hold no stake in
the association may pursue those interests only halfheartedly, such
that the "concrete adverseness" 7 sought by Article III's case-or-
controversy requirement will be lacking. Every instance of representa-
24 This is one of the primary justifications for associational standing. See text accompany-
ing notes 38-43.
25 See for example, Lujan, 504 US at 576 (stating that the courts exist to decide individual
rights, while "[v]indicating the public interest ... is the function of Congress and the Chief Ex-
ecutive"); Scalia, 17 Suffolk U L Rev at 896 (cited in note 21) (stating that "the doctrine of stand-
ing was once meant to restrict judges 'solely, to decide on the rights of individuals"' and should
again be so followed), quoting Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137,170 (1803).
26 Indeed, a supporter of the separation-of-powers view of standing may envision deriva-
tive standing taken to absurd lengths: What can stop an association of associations from bringing
suit on behalf of those secondary associations' members' third parties? One can imagine a pyra-
mid scheme of derivative standing gone wild, in which one head association ultimately brings suit
on behalf of all Americans via a circuitous path of associational and third-party standing loosely
applied.
27 Baker v Carr, 369 US 186,204 (1962).
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tional standing allows some slippage between the right-holder's posi-
tion and the litigant's position. This slippage compromises adversarial
litigation because the litigant is unlikely to advocate the right-holder's
position as zealously or as knowledgeably as the right-holder would
herself. Thus, there is a fear that allowing one representative litigant to
represent another who is herself a representative litigant will prove
more than the adversarial system can bear.
Second, derivative standing may adversely affect third parties' le-
gal positions. If third parties are either unaware or unwilling tools in a
derivative standing case, they may be unable to protect their own due
process interests. That is, if derivative standing affects third parties'
abilities to bring their own claims, then those third parties' legal rights
may be compromised without their awareness or consent; this would
be directly contrary to the principle of due process. Furthermore,
these third parties may not want their alleged injury to be redressed at
all, much less by the means that the association seeks to have judi-
cially enforced. Because the third parties are not members of the as-
sociation, they will have no capacity to vote against the litigation or
withdraw support from the association in the event of a disagreement.
Despite these concerns, derivative standing is not a departure
from the standing doctrines that the Court has long recognized and
accepted. I argue in Part III that if courts rigorously apply the individ-
ual requirements of associational and third-party standing before
permitting derivative standing, the concerns about adversarial quality
and due process fall away: The protections inherent to those two doc-
trines likewise protect those involved in derivative standing cases. Ad-
ditionally, because derivative standing necessarily arises from indi-
vidualized claims of an association's members' third parties, separa-
tion-of-powers concerns do not materialize. An understanding of the
theory behind associational and third-party standing is necessary to il-
lustrate why the Court has imposed the restrictions it has on these two
forms of standing, as well as how those protections will ensure that de-
rivative standing raises no new concerns while providing added bene-
fits.
II. LEGAL THEORIES OF ASSOCIATIONAL AND
THIRD-PARTY STANDING
The constitutional root of standing is the Article III Case or Con-
troversy Clause, which limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to
"Cases" and "Controversies."' The Court has interpreted this limita-
tion to mean that a would-be litigant must demonstrate three qualifi-
28 US Const Art III, § 1, c 2.
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cations before a court can hear her claim: injury in fact' to a "concrete,
personal interest";"° causal connection between the injury and the de-
fendant;3' and a likelihood that a favorable outcome will redress the
injury.' The Court has also noted that, more broadly, the "gist of the
question of standing" is whether the parties have alleged "such a per-
sonal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that con-
crete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends. 3 3 As the "irreducible constitu-
tional minimum of standing,"4 these requirements may not be waived.
The Court has also established prudential requirements of stand-
ing, which it has characterized as "part of judicial self-government."35
Under the prudential requirements, litigants must bring their own par-
ticularized claims rather than the claims of third parties, and the liti-
gant's complaint must be within the "zone of interests" of the statute
or constitutional guarantee in question.i These requirements, how-
ever, do not rise to the level of standing's constitutional requirements,
and courts may waive them as appropriate.37 Associational and third-
party standing are examples of such waivers.
A. Associational Standing
The Court has held that associations may sue on behalf of their
members even in the absence of injury to the association itself.- Thejustification for this extension of the standing doctrine is based pri-
marily on a functional understanding of associations. In many cases,
individuals form associations to represent their interests, both in legis-
latures and in the courts.3 Thus, to deny them standing would defeat a
29 See Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555,560 (1992).
30 Allen v Wright, 468 US 737,756 (1984).
31 See Lujan, 504 US at 560.
32 See id at 561.
33 Baker v Carr, 369 US 186,204 (1962).
34 Lujan, 504 US at 560.
35 Id.
36 Valley Forge Christian College v Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc, 454 US 464,474-75 (1982).
37 See, for example, Barrows v Jackson, 346 US 249, 257 (1953) (describing the prudential
requirement that parties represent only their own interests as "only a rule of practice" that could
be "outweighed by the need to protect... fundamental rights").
38 See, for example, Warth v Seldin, 422 US 490, 511 (1975), citing National Motor Freight
Association v United States, 372 US 246 (1963). Thus, associational standing differs from third-
party standing because Supreme Court jurisprudence requires no injury to the association analo-
gous to that required for the litigant in third-party standing suits. See, for example, Powers v
Ohio, 499 US 400,411 (1991) (stating that in third-party standing, the litigant must have suffered
some injury to him or herself to guarantee a sufficient interest in the litigation).
39 See International Union, UAW v Brock, 477 US 274,290 (1986) ("[T]he doctrine of asso-
ciational standing recognizes that the primary reason people join an organization is often to cre-
ate an effective vehicle for vindicating interests that they share with others.").
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significant part of the reason for associations' existence: "The only
practical judicial policy when people pool their capital, their interests,
or their activities under a name and form that will identify collective
interests, often is to permit the association or corporation in a single
case to vindicate the interests of all."' Because the developed test for
associational standing requires that associations sue only over claims
"germane" to the organization's purpose," there is some assurance
that suits will be limited to those relating to whatever subject matter
the members have joined and supported the association in an attempt
to further. 2 Additionally, the Court has noted practical benefits to al-
lowing associational standing in that "an association suing to vindicate
the interests of its members can draw upon a pre-existing reservoir of
expertise and capital," thus ensuring a high standard of aggressive ad-
41
vocacy.
Associational standing, however, is not available to every group.
In Hunt v Washington State Apple Advertising Commission," the Court
articulated the necessary elements for a claim based on associational
standing:
[W]e have recognized that an association has standing to bring
suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would oth-
erwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it
seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and
(c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires
the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. 5
These requirements collectively ensure that associational standing sat-
isfies the constitutional standing requirements.
The requirement that the members would have standing in their
own right is the first step toward satisfying the Article III case-or-
controversy requirement. The Court explained that "the Association
must allege that its members, or any one of them, are suffering imme-
diate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action of the
sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members them-
selves brought suit." This ensures that the suit will present an active
issue as required by the Case or Controversy Clause, rather than a re-
quest for an advisory opinion or some other policy matter best left to
40 Id (quotation marks omitted).
41 See Hunt v Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 US 333,343 (1977).
42 See Brock, 477 US at 290 ("The very forces that cause individuals to band together in an
association will thus provide some guarantee that the association will work to promote their in-
terests.").
43 Id at 289.
44 432 US 333 (1977).
45 Idat343.
46 Warth,422 US at 511.
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the political branches. Further, the requirement that the suit be ger-
mane to the association's purposes ensures both that the association
has an organizational stake in the litigation 7 and that the association's
capacity for bringing this type of suit is limited to litigation that vindi-
cates its stated purposes. Finally, the requirement that the suit not en-
tail any individual participation by the association's members guaran-
tees that the association is an appropriate litigant and that permitting
associational standing serves judicial economy in such a case.4 This re-
quirement also limits associational standing to claims for prospective
relief. Under these conditions, associational standing represents
sound judicial policy because it allows the consolidation of several
claims into one suit, guaranteeing that a litigant has both the institu-
tional capacity and interest to pursue litigation zealously.
While providing these benefits, associational standing does not
pose a threat to the due process interests of association members.
Since association members would not normally be parties to an asso-
ciational standing suit, an adverse judgment in the association's case
would not preclude subsequent claims by association members under
Martin v Wilks. ° In that case, the Court declared that interested third
parties (like association members) were not precluded from bringing
subsequent claims if they did not participate in a prior lawsuit. In
keeping with the holding of Martin, the Court has suggested that no
such preclusive effect should exist for association members."
The Martin holding also protects association members whose
interests conflict with the litigation that an association pursues, though
such conflicts mitigate the beneficial effects of associational standing.
Since associations invoking associational standing need not pass any
hurdle of representational adequacy, it is possible for associations to
pursue litigation benefiting some of their members at the expense of
47 See United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v Brown Group, Inc, 517 US
544, 555-56 (1996) ("Hunt's second prong ... raises an assurance that the association's litigators
will themselves have a stake in the resolution of the dispute, and thus be in a position to serve as
the defendant's natural adversary.").
48 See Nathaniel B. Edmonds, Comment, Associational Standing for Organizations with In-
ternal Conflicts of Interest, 69 U Chi L Rev 351,356 (2002) ("[T]he individual participation prong
... seeks to ensure that the association will be a better representative than individual members
would be in pursuing litigation, thus improving judicial efficiency."); Vivian Weston Lathers,
Comment, Associational Third-Party Standing and Federal Jurisdiction under Hunt, 64 Iowa L
Rev 121,132 (1978) ("This third provision, then, serves the interests of the courts by requiring all
proper parties to be before the court so that all pertinent facts can be presented and individual-
ized justice can be more adequately served.").
49 See Laurence Tribe, 1 American Constitutional Law § 3-20 at 452 (Foundation 3d ed
2000).
50 490 US 755 (1989).
51 See Brock, 477 US at 290 ("Should an association be deficient in [meeting representa-
tional adequacy], a judgment won against it might not preclude subsequent claims by the associa-
tion's members without offending due process principles.").
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others.52 Indeed, the Court has stated that a minimum of only one
member must be injured before an association can sue on that mem-
ber's behalf: 3 No uniformity of interests among a majority of the
membership is necessary.T Though Martin protects all association
members' due process rights, such internal conflicts of interest dimin-
ish the beneficial effects of associational standing for judicial economy
because an association pursuing some of its members' interests at the
expense of others' is not vindicating the interests of the aggregate of
its members and thus combining several related suits into one.5 In or-
der to preserve the benefits of associational standing, lower courts
have adopted a variety of tests to determine when an association's in-
ternal conflicts of interest are too profound to permit effective advo-
cacy by the association on behalf of its members.
6
B. Third-Party Standing
Litigants may also represent the interests of third parties in
courts under certain conditions. The Court has established three re-
quirements for third-party standing to exist. First, the litigant must
have suffered some injury to herself separate from the third party's in-
jury;57 this guarantees that the litigant will have a sufficient interest in
the litigation to pursue it zealously and satisfies the Article III re-
quirement of injury in fact.8 Second, the litigant must have a close re-
lationship with the third party;9 this ensures access to relevant infor-
mation necessary for concrete adverseness.! Finally, the third party
must be somehow hindered from bringing suit on her 
own behalf;61
52 One common example of an associational standing case where the association has an in-
ternal conflict of interest is trade associations litigating to have statutes providing contract pref-
erences to minority-owned businesses overturned. These statutes benefit minority-owned busi-
ness members of the association while harming other members. See Edmonds, Comment, 69 U
Chi L Rev at 351 (cited in note 48).
53 See Warth, 422 US at 511 ("The Association must allege that its members, or any one of
them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action.").
54 See Edmonds, Comment, 69 U Chi L Rev at 360-61 (cited in note 48) ("Many courts
have examined the second prong of the Hunt test in determining the appropriate limits of ger-
maneness to an organization, but none has found that unanimity of membership is required, or
that any internal conflict of interest automatically forecloses associational standing.").
55 See Donald F Simone, Note, Associational Standing and Due Process: The Need for an
Adequate Representation Scrutiny, 61 B U L Rev 174, 176 (1981) (stating that the Court rational-
izes associational standing because an association is considered to be the aggregate of its mem-
bers).
56 See Edmonds, Comment, 69 U Chi L Rev at 351 (cited in note 48).
57 See Powers, 499 US at 411.
58 See notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
59 See Singleton v Wulff, 428 US 106,115 (1976).
60 See id ("[T]he relationship between the litigant and the third party may be such that the
former is fully, or very nearly, as effective a proponent of the right as the latter.").
61 See id at 115-16.
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this requirement ameliorates the concern that the third party may not
wish to assert her rights or that those rights are not truly at issue.6'
These conditions are strictly applied because "[o]rdinarily, one may
not claim standing ... to vindicate the constitutional rights of some
third party." This is based on the understanding that the third party is
likely to be a better proponent of her own rights than the would-be
litigant. As a result, courts exercise caution in permitting third-party
standing. '
Even in light of this caution, however, the Court has recognized
that third-party standing is occasionally appropriate:
If the enjoyment of the right is inextricably bound up with the ac-
tivity the litigant wishes to pursue, the court at least can be sure
that its construction of the right is not unnecessary in the sense
that the right's enjoyment will be unaffected by the outcome of
the suit. Furthermore, the relationship between the litigant and
the third party may be such that the former is fully, or very
nearly, as effective a proponent of the right as the latter.6
Given the strict application of these three conditions, third-party
standing allows for a reasonable expansion of the opportunity to liti-
gate without overly compromising separation of powers or permitting
unchecked litigation on behalf of unwilling or unwitting third parties.
An early example of the allowance of third-party standing is Bar-
rows v Jackson,' in which the Court permitted a white homeowner,
defending a breach of contract claim for allowing non-whites to oc-
cupy her home despite a racial covenant, to argue an affirmative de-
fense based on the constitutional rights of potential black buyers. Be-
cause the unnamed black buyers were not parties to the contract ac-
tion, they could not argue their own constitutional rights. However,
the white homeowner faced injury based on the violation of their con-
stitutional rights because she would be compelled to pay damages if
the breach of contract action were upheld. The Court explained: "[W]e
believe the reasons which underlie our rule denying standing to raise
another's rights, which is only a rule of practice, are outweighed by the
need to protect the fundamental rights which would be denied by
permitting the damages action to be maintained."67 Thus, third-party
standing was allowed for the white defendant because the interests of
62 See id ("If there is some genuine obstacle to [the third party's assertion of his own
rights], however, the third party's absence from court loses its tendency to suggest that his right is
not truly at stake, or truly important to him.").
63 Barrows, 346 US at 255.
64 See Singleton, 428 US at 113-14.
65 Id at 114-15.
66 346 US 249 (1953).
67 Idat257.
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justice required the invalidation of the racial covenant, but the Court
could invalidate it only by relying on the constitutional rights of the
potential black buyers. Article III was satisfied because the defendant
faced injury in her own right, thus guaranteeing a true case or contro-
versy." In addition, the prudential concern that the unnamed black
home buyers would be compelled to have rights protected that they
might not desire having protected was mitigated because it was clear
that regardless of their wishes, the only way their rights could be pro-
tected was for the homeowner to have standing on their behalf. '
While the requirement that the right-holder be hindered from
bringing suit on her own behalf is intended to ensure that litigants ar-
gue third parties' claims only when such a scenario serves the interests
of justice, interpretations of this requirement have varied. In an early
case permitting third-party standing, the Court allowed standing be-
cause the hindrance was procedurally insurmountable. In NAACP v
Patterson,0 the Court allowed the NAACP to argue its members'
rights to freedom of association in refusing to give their membership
list to the state of Alabama because forcing the members to litigate
this right on their own would be a denial of the very right in question.
The Court stated, "To require that [the right to freedom of associa-
tion] be claimed by the members themselves would result in nullifica-
tion of the right at the very moment of its assertion."'" Barrows in-
volved a similar situation of procedurally insurmountable hindrance,
making third-party standing appropriate. 2
But in subsequent cases, courts have recognized third-party
standing where the hindrance is not insurmountable. In more recent
cases, courts have allowed third-party standing where the sole hin-
drance to the third party is a limited incentive to litigate on her own
behalf. For example, in Powers v Ohio,3 the Court held that an ex-
cluded juror's limited incentive to bring a suit based on racial dis-
crimination in jury selection satisfied the hindrance requirement for a
criminal defendant to obtain third-party standing on the juror's behalf.
In a different case, Justice Brennan expressed concern that the Court
"only rarely interpose[s] a bar to third-party standing."" The evolution
68 See id at 255-56 (finding respondent satisfied injury requirement because she might
have to pay damages, which would "constitute a direct, pocketbook injury").
69 See id at 259 ("[R]espondent is the only effective adversary of the unworthy cove-
nant.").
70 357 US 449 (1958).
71 Idat459.
72 See 346 US at 259.
73 499 US 400,415 (1991).
74 Valley Forge Christian College, 454 US at 493 n 4 (Brennan dissenting).
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of the lowering of the hindrance standard has likewise been cause for
concern among legal scholars."
As more recent Court decisions allowing third-party standing
have diminished the need to show an insurmountable hindrance, it be-
comes more difficult to see a consistent framework that describes the
series of third-party standing decisions. One possibility is that third-
party standing cases are, in most instances, actually a form of first-
party standing. Under this conception, the defendant in Barrows, for
example, was effectively attempting to vindicate her own right to sell
her house to black buyers. The criminal defendant in Powers was as-
serting his own right to a trial with a racially integrated jury pool. In
other words, these two litigants sought to vindicate their own personal
rights to interact with the third parties in question without being sub-
ject to regulations that violated the third parties' constitutional rights
and made the interaction impossible. Thus, these litigants sought to as-
sert their own "interactive liberty":
[A] litigant asserts his own rights (not those of a third person)
when he seeks to void restrictions that directly impair his free-
dom to interact with a third person who himself could not legally
be prevented from engaging in the interaction.... The litigant is
asserting a substantive due process right to interact with a third
party right holder free from unjustifiable governmental interfer-
ence.
III. DERIVATIVE STANDING AS A VALID AND BENEFICIAL
EXTENSION OF STANDING DOCTRINE
As discussed in Part I.B, there is a persistent idea that derivative
standing is fundamentally different from either associational or third-
party standing because derivative standing involves two steps between
the right-holder and the litigant, while associational and third-party
standing each involve only one. In actuality, however, the extra step
poses no constitutional or practical problem, and derivative standing
is therefore a valid extension of standing doctrine. By adhering to the
requirements the Court has established for those two doctrines indi-
vidually, courts can ensure that no additional problems arise from
their combination.
75 See, for example, Henry P Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 Colum L Rev 277, 278
(1984) (expressing concern that third-party standing had been reduced to "discretionary rules of
judicial practice"); David P Currie, Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 S Ct Rev 41. These criti-
cisms correctly suggest that, as courts lower the hindrance requirement to allow more litigants to
bring third-party suits, the concern that those third parties will have their interests litigated con-
trary to their wishes increases. See text accompanying notes 125-26.
76 Monaghan, 84 Colum L Rev at 282,299 (cited in note 75).
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There are two prongs to the test for derivative standing: An asso-
ciation may assert derivative standing only when it can demonstrate 1)
that it has associational standing on behalf of its members; and 2) that
its members have third-party standing on behalf of some third-party
right-holders.7 More specifically, the litigating association must assert
its own associational standing by demonstrating the following three
factors: its members would have standing in their own right, the sub-
ject of the litigation is germane to the association's purpose, and indi-
vidual participation by the association's members will not be neces-
sary for successful litigation."' It must separately assert that its mem-
bers would have third-party standing in their own right to bring the
third-party right-holders' claims. To assert the association members'
third-party standing, the litigating association must show the following
three factors: the members have suffered injury to themselves, the
members have a close relationship with the right-holders, and the
right-holders are hindered from bringing their own claims.9 Derivative
standing fails if any of these six factors is not present. If standing law is
in fact properly applied such that all six of these factors are present,
courts can ensure that an association will represent its members' third
parties with the same adversarial zeal with which it would represent
its own members or with which an individual litigant would represent
a third party. Further, such litigation will not affect the rights of the
members' third parties, nor will the association's representation be in-
adequate in protecting those rights. Finally, derivative standing does
not allow groups to gain inappropriate access to courts.
A. Adversarial Quality
The Article III case-or-controversy requirement and the Court's
prudential standing requirements recognize that in an adversarial
system, courts are in the best position to decide parties' rights when
both parties represent their interests zealously. Such zealous advocacy
promotes concrete adverseness by indicating the full extent of support
that exists for each position and ensuring that the dispute presents an
active issue rather than a broad question of policy or source for an ad-
visory opinion. Any form of representational standing potentially
compromises this concrete adverseness because the party whose right
is being advocated (and who generally has the most at stake) is not
77 This two-pronged test results from the definition of derivative standing as the combina-
tion of associational and third-party standing.
78 These are the standard requirements for associational standing. See Hunt, 432 US at 343.
79 These are the standard requirements for third-party standing. See Powers, 499 US at 411.
80 For a discussion of the constitutional and prudential standing requirements, see text ac-
companying notes 28-37.
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before the court;8' derivative standing, with its two steps of removal
between litigant and right-holder, raises this concern doubly. However,
to assert derivative standing, a litigating association will need to show
that its members have third-party standing to bring the claims at issue.
The requirements for third-party standing are sufficient to ensure that
an association's members-and by turn the association -have the
requisite interest in a derivative-standing lawsuit to guarantee con-
crete adverseness. To achieve third-party standing, the members of an
association must themselves suffer injury' and must be involved in a
significant relationship with the third parties;8 these requirements
guarantee an interest in the outcome and access to necessary informa-
tion. The presence of these factors will ensure that derivative standing
satisfies both the constitutional and prudential requirements for
standing.
1. Concrete adverseness and the constitutional requirements in
derivative standing.
The Court has interpreted Article III to require that litigants
demonstrate a concrete injury to themselves in order to achieve stand-
ing." This requirement serves in large part to ensure concrete adverse-
ness in litigation because litigants who have suffered an injury are
most likely to provide zealous advocacy. Because this is a constitu-
tional requirement, any extension of standing doctrine must satisfy it;
it cannot be waived." The Court has held that third-party standing sat-
isfies the injury-in-fact requirement because a third-party litigant must
demonstrate an injury to herself in addition to the right-holder's in-
jury."' The injury to the litigant ensures that she will maintain an inter-
est in the litigation and advocate zealously on the third party's behalf."
Associational standing is somewhat different because the litigating as-
sociation need not be injured in its own right. Because its primary
81 Representational standing, by definition, occurs when the litigant represents the inter-
ests of someone not before the court.
82 See Singleton v Wulff, 428 US 106,114-15 (1976) (noting that a sufficient congruence of
interests exists when the activity that the litigant wishes to pursue can occur only if the third-
party right is vindicated).
83 See Powers, 499 US at 411.
84 See Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555,560 (1992).
85 See text accompanying note 34.
86 See Powers, 499 US at 411. See also Robert Allen Sedler, The Assertion of Constitutional
Jus Tertii: A Substantive Approach, 70 Cal L Rev 1308, 1318 (1982) (arguing that third-party
standing satisfies Article III because where "plaintiffs and defendants assert an injury to them-
selves, [they] clearly fulfill[] standing requirements").
87 See Powers, 499 US at 411 (noting that for third-party standing, "[tihe litigant must have
suffered an 'injury in fact,' thus giving him or her a 'sufficiently concrete interest' in the outcome
of the issue in dispute"), quoting Singleton, 428 US at 112.
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purpose is to act as a representative for its members,' an association
has no independent existence other than as a coalition of its members;
thus, the Court has held that an injury to an association's members is
equivalent to an injury to the association.8
Derivative standing likewise satisfies the Article III injury-in-fact
requirement. By definition, derivative standing arises only when an as-
sociation's members satisfy third-party standing requirements in their
own right.9' In order to have third-party standing, association members
must necessarily have suffered injury to themselves.9 'The litigating as-
sociation then brings suit on the basis of those injuries to its members
just as it would in the context of associational standing. According to
associational standing doctrine, when an association brings suit based
on its members' injuries, it satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement.9
Thus, in this sense, derivative standing presents no more of an exten-
sion of standing doctrine than either third-party or associational
standing; instead, derivative standing is fully consistent with both of
those well-established extensions. In a derivative standing suit, the
members-having suffered injury to themselves-have every incen-
tive to ensure that the association maintains an interest in the litiga-
tion and advocates zealously on their behalf, just as they do in associa-
tional standing suits.
While the association members in a derivative standing suit have
suffered injury to themselves, the association asserts not the members'
rights but the rights of those members' third parties.93 This is what dis-
88 See, for example, Warth v Seldin, 422 US 490,511 (1975) ("Even in the absence of injury
to itsel, an association may have standing solely as the representative of its members."), citing
National Motor Freight Traffic Association, Inc v United States, 372 US 246,247 (1963).
89 See Warth, 422 US at 511 ("[T]he Association must allege that its members, or any one
of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action of the
sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit.").
90 Derivative standing arises when an association asserts associational standing to bring
claims that the association's members would have third-party standing to bring in their own
right. For example, in Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society, the psychiatrists' trade association, PPS,
could assert derivative standing because its members, the psychiatrists, had third-party standing
in their own right to bring their patients' claims. See 280 F3d 278. Had the psychiatrists not had
third-party standing to bring their patients' claims, derivative standing would not have been pos-
sible for the association.
91 Such injury is a prerequisite of third-party standing. See note 86 and accompanying text.
92 See note 89 and accompanying text.
93 The facts of Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society, 280 F3d 278, provide a helpful illustration
of this concept. The right asserted in that case was the patients' right to authorization for psychi-
atric treatment under their contracts with HMOs. This right belonged to the patients, not their
psychiatrists. However, the psychiatrists were harmed by losing business when patients were
wrongfully denied authorization for treatment. Thus, the psychiatrists-and, in turn, the psychia-
trists' trade association, PPS-had sufficient interest in the litigation to advocate zealously for
enforcement of the patients' rights to treatment authorization. The injury to the psychiatrists in
the form of loss of business thus satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement, even though the right in
question belonged to the patients rather than the psychiatrists.
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tinguishes derivative standing from associational standing. However,
the Article III standing requirement is not concerned with whose
rights are being asserted. Rather, that inquiry is part of the prudential
test for standing. And it is the prudential component of standing to
which the Court has seen fit to make exceptions as justice requires.
These "judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal juris-
diction ' '4 may be-and frequently have been-waived or modified to
meet the needs of a given case or category of cases.9' Thus, since there
is nothing like the "irreducible constitutional minimum"9 of Article
III to tie down the prudential component of standing, derivative
standing should be permissible to the extent that it satisfies the same
prudential or equitable concerns as other exceptions to the prudential
rules of standing.
2. Concrete adverseness and the prudential requirements
of standing.
Under the prudential requirements of standing, a litigant may
normally pursue only her own interests9 However, the Court has
waived this prudential rule where the requirements for associational
and third-party standing are met. In those two situations, the pruden-
tial rule's "underlying justifications are absent"'' because the require-
ments for associational and third-party standing ensure concrete ad-
verseness even though the litigant is representing interests other than
her own. Extending this exception to allow derivative standing is also
consistent with the prudential rule's underlying justifications: Because
derivative standing arises only when all six requirements of associa-
tional and third-party standing together are met, concrete adverseness
is preserved even though the litigating association is not arguing its
own or its members' claims.
To achieve derivative standing, the association must show that its
members have third-party standing in their own right. To have third-
party standing, the members must be involved in some "close relation-
94 Allen v Wright, 468 US 737,751 (1984).
95 See, for example, Barrows, 346 US at 257 ("Under the peculiar circumstances of this
case, we believe the reasons which underlie our rule denying standing to raise another's rights,
which is only a rule of practice, are outweighed by the need to protect the fundamental rights
which would be denied by permitting the damages action to be maintained.") (emphasis added).
96 Lujan, 504 US at 560.
97 See, for example, Barrows, 346 US at 255 ("Ordinarily, one may not claim standing... to
vindicate the ... rights of some third party.")
98 Singleton, 428 US at 114 (referring to third-party standing). For a similar remark apply-
ing to associational standing, see Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v McGrath, 341 US 123,
187 (1951) (Jackson concurring) (calling associational standing "the only practical judicial pol-
icy").
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ship" with the right-holders.9 The close relationship requirement of
third-party standing ensures both that the litigant's and third party's
interests will be aligned and that the litigant will have access to rele-
vant information while pursuing the third party's claim. Past examples
of satisfactory relationships in third-party standing cases include ven-
dor/vendee,'O doctor/patient, 0 and defendant/juror.'"2
The crucial characteristic of these "close" relationships is that the
litigant benefits from victory in the suit irrespective of any benefits to
the third-party right-holder.0 3 That is, the Court has found a close rela-
tionship between the third-party litigant and the right-holder in situa-
tions where the two shared a relationship that was burdened so as to
injure both parties; the litigant then, seeking to regain her own inter-
active liberty,'" brought suit based on the third party's right. In other
words, "a litigant asserts his own rights (not those of a third person)
when he seeks to void restrictions that directly impair his freedom to
interact with a third person who himself could not legally be pre-
vented from engaging in the interaction."'05 For example, the house
owner in Barrows who wins a suit vindicating the equal protection
right of black buyers to buy her house wins for herself the ability to
sell the house to black buyers.la The Court has permitted third-party
standing in these cases precisely because it serves the interests of both
the litigant and the third-party right-holder.' °
In the context of derivative standing, it is the association mem-
bers who have third-party standing to bring the right-holders' claims.
Thus, according to the above formulation, the members would have an
interest in pursuing the suit irrespective of whatever benefit their vic-
tory would bring to the third-party right-holders. In other words, the
members would have an independent interest in securing a favorable
outcome.
99 See Powers, 499 US at 411.
100 See Craig v Boren, 429 US 190, 192-93 (1976).
101 See Singleton, 428 US at 117.
102 See Powers, 499 US at 415.
103 Because the third-party right being asserted does not necessarily match up with the liti-
gant's injury, simply vindicating the right would not necessarily secure redress for the plaintiff's
injury. However, by requiring a close relationship between the litigant and the third party, it be-
comes more likely that the third party's right and the litigant's injury will map on to each other.
Hence, these two requirements work synergistically to ensure concrete adverseness.
104 See text accompanying note 76.
105 Monaghan, 84 Colum L Rev at 299 (cited in note 75).
106 See generally Barrows, 346 US 249. See also text accompanying note 76.
107 This does not answer the question of whether, in all cases, the third-party right-holder is
necessarily desirous of having her right vindicated. It is certainly plausible that in some instances,
a right-holder might prefer to see her right not vindicated. The hindrance requirement of third-
party standing seeks to ameliorate this concern, and I will discuss the issue further in the follow-
ing section. See text accompanying notes 124-27.
1056 [70:1037
Representational Standing
Derivative standing, however, adds the additional step of associa-
tional standing: The association, not its members, litigates the claims.
But if the members in fact have an interest in the litigation apart from
the third-party right-holders -that is, if the members have their own
independent interest--then derivative standing is prudentially no dif-
ferent from associational standing.' 08 It is simply an association repre-
senting its members' independent interests. This answers the concern
that two steps of removal between the litigant and the right-holder
will create too much slippage to ensure concrete adverseness.' On the
contrary, the association will have just as much incentive to advocate
zealously for its members' independent interests in a derivative stand-
ing suit as it would in an associational standing suit. In both cases, the
association represents its members' independent interests. Similarly, in
both cases, having the association represent the aggregate of its mem-
bers' interests can provide significant economies of scale and is thus
not merely prudentially sound, but also prudentially advisable.""
B. Due Process and the Interests of the Members' Third Parties
Apart from any concerns about derivative standing and the pres-
ervation of concrete adverseness, there may be concern that allowing
associations to sue on behalf of their members' third parties rather
than the members themselves will impede due process because the as-
sociation may be an inadequate representative of the interests of non-
members with no stake in the association. But derivative standing
poses no greater concern than do associational standing and third-
party standing individually. Furthermore, derivative standing offers
benefits of increased access to justice. The protections of associational
standing serve to ensure that the third parties will not lose due process
rights thanks to litigation undertaken based on derivative standing;
108 The interests that the members would seek to vindicate must also be germane to the as-
sociation's purpose in order to invoke associational standing and the resulting derivative stand-
ing. See Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society, 280 F3d at 291, quoting Hunt, 432 US at 343:
A third-party claim must also meet the requirement[] that "the interests it seeks to protect
are germane to the organization's purpose." . . . Th[is] factor inform[s] the analysis
whether an association stands in the correct relationship to a claim to allow it to assert that
claim on behalf of others.
The germaneness of the members' interest to the association's purpose further serves to ensure
that the association will pursue the claim with requisite zeal.
109 See Part I.B.2.
110 One commentator noted that "[blesides financial resources, organizations often have
specialized expertise and research resources relating to the subject matter of the lawsuit that in-
dividualized plaintiffs lack." Dale Gronemeier, Comment, From Net to Sword: Organizational
Representatives Litigating Their Members' Claims, 1974 U Ill L F 663, 669. According to the
Court, "[tihese resources can assist both courts and plaintiffs." International Union, UAW v
Brock, 477 US 274,289 (1986).
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the protections of both associational and third-party standing serve to
ensure that those third parties will not be forced into acting as liti-
gants or pursuing claims that they prefer not to pursue.
1. Due process effects of derivative standing.
It is a fundamental principle of due process that "one is not
bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not
designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by
service of process."'. For this reason, an adverse outcome in an asso-
ciational standing suit does not preclude subsequent claims of the as-
sociation members."2 Members are not parties to litigation in an asso-
ciational standing case, but rather interested third parties. ' It is settled
law that the claims of interested third parties may not be precluded by
prior adverse judgments."4 To the extent that any courts have allowed
such claim preclusion against association members, their decisions
conflict with the holding of Martin v Wilks."'
This means that association members cannot face preclusion be-
cause of the association's prior litigation even though association
members are voluntarily involved in the association and likely have
some impact on the association's decision whether and how to under-
take the litigation. The members' third parties (that is, the psychia-
trists' patients in Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society), however, have not
joined the association and have no say in its course of action; they are
even less "interested" than the members themselves. If the members
cannot face preclusion, then it follows that their third parties cannot
either."' This point is made particularly clear when one considers that
111 Hansberry v Lee, 311 US 32, 40 (1940) (holding that petitioners were not bound by a
prior adjudication of the validity of a restrictive covenant because they were not in privity with
any party from the prior adjudication).
112 For the purposes of this discussion, I use "preclusion" to refer to both issue and claim
preclusion. The analysis applies to them equally. Also, note that in the case of representational
standing, an "adverse" outcome from the perspective of the right-holder whose interests are liti-
gated by another could include either a suit in which the litigant fails or one in which the litigant
is victorious, but the right-holder opposed the litigant's position.
113 It is instructive to compare an associational standing suit to a class action suit. In a class
action suit, the representative plaintiff must demonstrate rigorous adequacy, typicality, and
commonality qualifications. See FRCP 23. In the absence of these qualifications, the class will not
be certified, and judgments for or against the representative plaintiff will not extend to the other
class members. The analogous qualifications required for associational standing do not rise to the
level of the class action requirements. See Brock, 477 US at 288-90.
114 See Martin, 490 US at 762.
115 490 US at 762. For a discussion of this issue written before the Martin decision and a
recommendation that courts undertake more stringent examinations of the adequacy of associa-
tions as representatives because of the danger of such subsequent claim preclusions, see Simone,
Note, 61 B U L Rev at 184-87 (cited in note 55).
116 Like the association members, the members' third parties would constitute "interested
third parties" under Martin.
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associational standing is permitted even when there is a minor inter-
nal conflict of interest among the association's members or when less
than a majority of the members explicitly support the litigation." Be-
cause the members' individual claims are not precluded upon the as-
sociation's failure in litigation, due process considerations raise little
concern. And irrespective of any minor internal conflicts of interest,
the benefits of associational standing to judicial efficiency remain:
Claims for prospective relief shared by a number of association mem-
bers are litigated in one case by one party that enjoys a "reservoir of
expertise and capital."''.
Internal conflicts of interest should not be of greater concern for
derivative standing than for associational standing. Functionally
speaking, conflicts of interest among members' third parties may be
less likely to prevent the association from going forward in litigation
than conflicts of interest within the association's membership because
the third parties are not entitled to a say in the association's decision
whether to undertake litigation. However, associations asserting de-
rivative standing will have to demonstrate that their members have
third-party standing to bring the third-party right-holders' claims. The
protections afforded those third-party right-holders by the third-party
standing requirements will ensure a degree of unanimity equal to that
of the members themselves.
The association members will rightly have third-party standing
only when they are involved in close relationships with the third par-
ties and when some invalid condition on those relationships injures
both the association members and the third parties."' The legal theory
behind these conditions is that through their application, the litigant
and the third-party right-holder's interests are both served when the
litigant is victorious; third-party standing is prudentially sound be-
cause its close relationship requirement serves to ensure that the liti-
gant's and the right-holder's interests are well aligned."' In the context
of derivative standing, the association members will have third-party
standing only if their interests are well aligned with the third-party
117 See, for example, National Association of College Bookstores, Inc v Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 990 F Supp 245,251 (SD NY 1997) ("[M]inor conflicts involving a small minority of an
association's membership [are] immaterial to standing analysis."). See also note 56 and accom-
panying text. For a more thorough discussion of internal conflict in associational standing, see
generally Edmonds, Comment, 69 U Chi L Rev 351 (cited in note 48).
118 Brock, 477 US at 289. See also National Association of College Bookstores, 990 F Supp at
251 (stating that denying associational standing in all cases of minor internal conflict of interest
"would clearly be inimical to the goal of judicial efficiency: It is precisely in cases where large or-
ganizations are present that the greatest benefits are to be reaped by collective adjudication").
119 See Powers, 499 US at 411; Monaghan, 84 Colum L Rev at 297 (cited in note 75). See
also text accompanying note 76.
120 See text accompanying notes 99-109.
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right-holders. Because the members' interests must align with the
third-party right-holders' interests, the third-party right-holders will
face a conflict of interest in precisely the same measure as the mem-
bers themselves. Therefore, the analysis of internal conflicts of interest
ought to be the same as is normally undertaken in associational stand-
ing.
The above analysis also answers the concern that an association
may not have the members' third parties' best interests in mind when
it pursues litigation. The requirements for third-party standing make it
such that even if the association strives solely for the benefit of its own
members, a successful outcome to its litigation will likewise inure to
the benefit of the third-party right-holders since the members' and
third-party right-holders' interests will be aligned. Because the legal
theory of third-party standing suggests that the practice is prudential
only when its allowance will further the cause of both the litigant and
the third party, any litigation that benefits the association members
must necessarily benefit their third parties.
2. Collateral effects on members' third parties.
One potential problem of derivative standing is that it allows an
association to achieve its own ends by using the claims of third-party
right-holders who do not wish to have their rights litigated. However,
the concern that the third-party right-holders will become unwitting
and unwilling quasi-plaintiffs is no greater than the related concern in
standard third-party standing. The Court has recognized that ordinar-
ily, "the courts should not adjudicate such rights [of third parties] un-
necessarily, and it may be that in fact the holders of those rights either
do not wish to assert them, or will be able to enjoy them regardless of
whether the in-court litigant is successful or not.''.2 However, this has
not prevented the court from accepting the practice of third-party
standing under those conditions spelled out above.n One answer to
this issue is that the requirement of a close relationship ensures that
the court adjudicates the third party's right only when such an adjudi-
cation is necessary for the litigant to engage in that relationship.'
The requirement that the third party be somehow hindered from
bringing her own claim, though, is the primary answer to this con-
121 Singleton, 428 US at 113-14.
122 See text accompanying notes 57-62.
123 See Singleton, 428 US at 114-15:
If the enjoyment of the right is inextricably bound up with the activity the litigant wishes to
pursue, the court at least can be sure that its construction of the right is not unnecessary in
the sense that the right's enjoyment will be unaffected by the outcome of the suit.
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cern. '' This answer applies equally to derivative standing. Because the
association members must satisfy the requirements for third-party
standing before derivative standing can exist, it is a necessary condi-
tion that the members' third parties must be somehow hindered from
bringing suit in their own right. This minimizes the chance that the
third-party right-holders' collective silence reflects an aversion to
their rights' vindication.
This becomes problematic, however, if the hindrance requirement
is blithely passed over in a court's analysis of the requisite conditions
for derivative standing. As courts and commentators have noted, the
hindrance requirement for standard third-party standing has declined
from being a requirement of insurmountable hindrance'" to one of
limited incentive. M There seems to be little theoretical principle be-
hind the hindrance requirement since its form has been so malleable.
But this condition is particularly important in the case of derivative
standing because the group of third parties is sufficiently large and dif-
fuse that there is a real danger that some third parties may have rights
litigated contrary to their wishes. Fortunately, the conflict of interest
analysis discussed above also serves to protect those third parties who
would oppose the association's litigation to some extent, so even in
light of the currently unsettled jurisprudence in this area, the unwel-
come effects of derivative standing will be minimized.
On its flip side, the hindrance requirement serves to illustrate the
significant benefits of derivative standing. The third parties in question
in derivative standing are, by virtue of the third-party standing restric-
tions, somehow hindered from bringing suit on their own behalf. By
permitting derivative standing, those third parties' rights will be liti-
gated by a body (the association) with a "reservoir of expertise and
capital.'.. Furthermore, associational standing serves judicial economy
by bringing together the claims of a group of association members to
be litigated by one advocate. Third-party standing serves the interests
of justice by allowing the litigation of a right that would otherwise not
be vindicated. Combined into derivative standing, these two doctrines
mean that the members' third parties will see their rights litigated in
court by a particularly efficient and competent advocate.
124 See id at 116 ("If there is some genuine obstacle to such assertion, however, the third
party's absence from court loses its tendency to suggest that his right is not truly at stake, or truly
important to him, and the party who is in court becomes by default the right's best available pro-
ponent.").
125 See Patterson, 357 US at 459 (allowing third-party standing where a requirement that
the right-holders litigate on their own behalf was tantamount to denying the right altogether).
126 See Powers, 499 US at 414-15 (holding that excluded juror's limited incentive to bring
discrimination suit satisfied obstacle requirement for criminal defendant to merit third-party
standing).
127 Brock, 477 US at 289.
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C. Derivative Standing and Separation of Powers
Finally, some have argued that any standing doctrine that allows
greater access to federal courts should be treated with suspicion, since
standing is a fundamental principle of separation of powers, keeping
the courts limited to their proper role. Under this argument, exten-
sions of representational standing are particularly worrisome because
when the party before the court is not the right-holder, the courts are
less certain that they are not deciding questions (and potentially im-
posing their own views on the other branches) unnecessarily. ' The
separation-of-powers argument might be particularly applicable in the
case of derivative standing because derivative standing permits an
association to bring claims on behalf of a diffuse group of people who
likely suffer injuries too small to merit litigation on their own behalf.
An association may attempt to achieve sweeping policy changes by
uniting the minimal claims of third-party right-holders-who would
not likely pursue the claims in their own right and may even oppose
the association's litigation-and forcing courts to pick a side. Such a
scenario may "require a court to rule on important ... issues in the ab-
stract [and] create the potential for abuse of the judicial process ...
and open the Judiciary to an arguable charge of providing 'govern-
ment by injunction. ' '' ..°
Derivative standing, however, does not violate the principle of
separation of powers because the litigating association's claim arises
from the concrete injuries of the third-party right-holders."' Though
the association is uniquely removed from the right-holder in deriva-
tive standing, that removal does not render the right-holder's injury
any less concrete. And as long as there is a concrete injury before the
court (even if the right-holder who was concretely injured is not the
litigant), the court will be able to determine the bounds of its judicial
authority and obligation. "[T]he discrete factual context within which
the concrete injury occurred or is threatened insures the framing of
128 See generally Scalia, 17 Suffolk U L Rev at 881 (cited in note 21).
129 See Warth, 422 US at 500:
Without such limitations [as the prudential requirement that parties represent their own in-
terests] the court would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public signifi-
cance even though other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the
questions and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual
rights.
130 Schlesinger v Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 US 208,222 (1974).
131 For an association to assert derivative standing, it must be able to demonstrate that its
members have third-party standing to bring the third-party right-holders' claims. If the third-
party right-holders have no colorable claims (in other words, if they have suffered no concrete
injury), then there are no claims that the association members have third-party standing to bring,
and derivative standing necessarily fails.
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relief no broader than required by the precise facts to which the
court's ruling would be applied.""'
The fact that the right-holders' concrete injuries are small and
widely shared also poses no problem for separation of powers. The
Court has determined that "generalized grievances" -namely abstract
harms that are widely shared-are not appropriate for judicial review
but rather should be reserved for the political process.' 3 But the Court
has distinguished generalized grievances from widely shared concrete
injuries: "Often the fact that an interest is abstract and the fact that it
is widely shared go hand in hand. But their association is not invari-
able, and where a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court
has found 'injury in fact."" Since derivative standing applies only
where the third-party right-holders have suffered concrete injury,"' the
fact that their injuries are widely shared does not conflict with the
principle of separation of powers.
Even though the third-party right-holders have suffered concrete
injury, there may remain a concern that the litigating association's two
steps of removal from those right-holders adversely affects the asso-
ciation's ability to define those concrete injuries before the court.
However, as discussed in Part III.A, the requirements of associational
and third-party standing-which the association must demonstrate in
order to assert derivative standing-assuage this concern. The associa-
tion must show that its members have third-party standing to bring
the right-holders' claims. This in turn requires that the members have
a close relationship with the third-party right-holders, which ensures
that the members have access to necessary information and an align-
ment of interests with the right-holders.'6 The association must also
show that it has associational standing on behalf of its members. This
in turn requires that the claims in question not be of a type where in-
dividual participation by the members (or, in derivative standing, by
the third-party right-holders) is necessary." Thus, no injury where spe-
cific, personal information is necessary will come under the rubric of
derivative standing, and the association members will have a close re-
lationship with the third-party right-holders to obtain whatever in-
formation is necessary.
132 Schlesinger, 418 US at 222.
133 See, for example, Federal Election Commission v Akins, 524 US 11, 23 (1998) ("[Wlhere
large numbers of Americans suffer alike, the political process, rather than the judicial process,
may provide the more appropriate remedy for a widely shared grievance.").
134 Id at 24.
135 See note 131.
136 See notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
137 See Hunt, 432 US at 343.
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Furthermore, the same prudential reasons that have made us ac-
cept associational and third-party standing individually are at work
here. While an argument can be made that some of the third-party
right-holders might not desire to see their claims vindicated, an argu-
ment at least equally powerful can be made to the opposite effect: If
derivative standing provides an avenue into the courts for people with
justiciable claims that will otherwise not be brought, then it promotes
the operation of justice.'" Those third-party right-holders who believe
that a court wrongly decided derivative standing litigation in favor of
the association are not subsequently precluded from bringing their
own claims.
Even if permitting derivative standing means opening the courts
to claims they might not otherwise hear, requiring the rigorous tests of
third-party and associational standing will guarantee that those claims
are zealously advocated and that the adjudication satisfies due proc-
ess. Furthermore, the prerequisites to achieving derivative standing
will ensure that organizations will not invent a derivative standing
case simply to achieve their own policy objectives. Beyond the neces-
sity of a concrete injury to the third-party right-holders, the associa-
tion must demonstrate that it satisfies the requirements for associa-
tional standing to bring its members' claims and that its members sat-
isfy the requirements for third-party standing to bring the claims of
the third-party right-holders."9 Even if derivative standing could theo-
retically expand to encompass the claims of millions in a law school
hypothetical, such an outcome is inconceivable in the real world. The
substantial burden of establishing the presence of all factors required
for derivative standing would preclude such an outcome. The federal
courts should not be closed to this type of claim merely for the sake of
limiting standing and thereby access to the courts: Where an extension
of the standing doctrine serves to allow the courts to reach concrete
injuries, it falls well within the bounds of the traditional judicial role.
CONCLUSION
Derivative standing creates no greater perils than does either as-
sociational or third-party standing individually, but it promises addi-
tional benefits. The protections that courts have built into associa-
tional and third-party standing to ensure constitutionality and pru-
dence work to ensure the same in derivative standing. Furthermore,
138 A broad reading of Marbury v Madison supports this interpretation: "The very essence
of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws, whenever he receives an injury." 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
139 For a discussion of what these demonstrations entail, see text accompanying notes
77-79.
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the benefits of derivative standing accede to courts in the form of ju-
dicial economy and to people somehow barred from pursuing their
own claims in the form of improved access to justice. Courts should al-
low the practice of derivative standing under the recommended condi-
tions.

